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Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy Hardball
Jared Ellias1
By many accounts, we have entered an era of unprecedented
contentiousness in debtor-creditor relations. For an example of the
new status quo, consider the recent actions of PetSmart, a
perfectly normal American corporation struggling with debt from
a leveraged buyout gone sour. The textbook account of corporate
governance would suggest that PetSmart’s board of directors
would respond to this financial distress by seeking to improve the
underlying business or, perhaps, by filing for Chapter 11
bankruptcy to maximize the value of the firm for the benefit of
creditors. Instead, PetSmart’s board authorized a transaction that
seems shocking for a firm in its situation: It took $1.5 billion out
of the reach of creditors, distributing about $900 million to its
shareholders and placing $750 million in a subsidiary that was not
an obligor on its $9 billion in debt.
This type of scorched-earth maneuvering is a form of
“bankruptcy hardball.” To be sure, distressed companies and their
major financial creditors have always had their share of combative
negotiations, conflict, and litigation. But the current level of chaos
and rent-seeking is unprecedented. It is now routine for distressed
firms to engage in tactics that harm some creditors for the benefit
of other stakeholders, often in violation of contractual promises
and basic principles of corporate finance. It is quite revealing that,
after PetSmart removed nearly $2 billion from the reach of
creditors, the trading price of its bonds actually increased in value.
The bondholders who were still harmed by the transaction likely
breathed a sigh of relief because they had feared far worse.
Although unthinkable only a few years ago, a distressed firm’s
redistribution of nearly $2 billion away from its creditors is seen,
in today’s environment, as unexpectedly generous to those same
creditors because its private-equity owner did not help itself to
more.

1

Excerpted and adapted from Jared A. Ellias & Robert A. Stark,
Bankruptcy Hardball, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 745 (2020).
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The new environment is rooted, in part, in a series of recent
Delaware court decisions that added up to a radical change in law:
Creditors would no longer have the kind of common-law
protections from opportunism that helped protect their bargain for
the better part of two centuries. In these decisions—most
importantly Gheewalla followed by Quadrant Structured
Products2—the Delaware courts dramatically reduced the ability
of creditors of insolvent firms to prosecute claims for breach of
fiduciary duty. To be sure, other factors have contributed to the
status quo, such as debt-market conditions, a loosening of the
basket of traditional covenants, and broader economic factors. But
the common law’s retreat from protecting creditors has
qualitatively changed the liability calculus for boards of directors
of troubled firms.
To illustrate the change, consider the advice that law firms
provide to the boards of troubled companies. In an article for
clients written in 2001, prior to Gheewalla, a leading law firm
wrote that “[w]hen a corporation becomes insolvent, . . . [r]ather
than pursuing high-risk strategies for the benefit of shareholders,
directors must seek to protect creditors’ claims to corporate assets
and earnings.”3 After Quadrant, a leading law firm wrote in a
client alert that directors can now favor some creditors over others
without having to worry about liability.4 Similarly, another
leading law firm wrote that Quadrant will protect directors
“adopting a high-risk business strategy that might benefit
controlling shareholders when a corporation is insolvent.”5
This revolution in the common law was premised on the faulty
assumption that creditors are fully capable of protecting their
2

Quadrant Structured Prod. Co. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155 (Del. Ch. 2014);
N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92
(Del. 2007).
3
See J. Douglas Bacon & Jennifer A. Love, When Good Things Happen
to Bad People: Practical Aspects of Holding Directors and Managers of
Insolvent Corporations Accountable, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 185, 186
(2001).
4
See John L. Reed & Henry duPont Ridgley, Delaware Court of
Chancery Issues Significant Ruling on the Ability of Creditors to Assert
Fiduciary Duty Claims Against Directors: Key Takeaways, DLA PIPER
(May 14, 2015).
5
See Mark S. Chehi, Delaware Court of Chancery Decision Clarifies
Fiduciary Issues in Insolvent Company Context, SKADDEN (Jan. 2015).
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bargain during periods of distress with contracts and bankruptcy
law. The reality is contrary to that undergirding assumption, for
several reasons.
First, the creditor’s bargain often is an easy target for
opportunistic repudiation and, in turn, dashed expectations once
distress sets in. Even the most sophisticated creditors cannot
protect themselves with contract law alone. They cannot foresee
every contingency ex ante, and skilled debtor’s lawyers can often
find ways to get around even carefully written contracts. For
example, the bondholders of Forest Oil contracted ex ante for
redemption in the event of a change in control—only to see the
debtor claim it “contracted around” that covenant even though the
firm had, in fact, been sold to a new controller.
Second, while bankruptcy law does protect creditors, it also
answers to other policy goals, such as reorganizing distressed
firms and protecting jobs. And well-advised debtors and creditors
can run strategic and smart bankruptcy processes that use
procedural tools to pressure the judge into making decisions that
further the policy goal of say, promoting reorganization, even at
the expense of vindicating creditor rights. Bankrupt
LyondellBassell’s managers, for example, exploited an odd quirk
of bankruptcy law to settle valuable fraudulent-transfer claims
worth potentially billions, without, initially, the input of the
unsecured creditors who were the real plaintiffs. Bankruptcy law
can protect the rights of creditors, but it can also be used to take
rights away from creditors that they would have had outside of
bankruptcy. This sort of bankruptcy hardball may help explain
why PetSmart’s board decided to make such an opportunistic
distribution of value: with funds already in hand, the firm’s
private-equity sponsor became better positioned to get more than
it might be entitled to at the conclusion of a bankruptcy process or
out-of-court restructuring.
Although the Delaware courts have paved the way for
bankruptcy hardball to become the de facto mode of distressed
governance, judges can help fix the problem by pushing back
against overreach. Gheewalla is not the only force that has
reshaped debtor-creditor relations. Perpetually favorable debtmarket conditions in the years after the financial crisis have
reduced the bargaining power of debt investors and emboldened
managers, and the rise of hedge funds and claims trading has
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changed the administration of Chapter 11. The status quo could be
improved if today’s standards were applied more rigorously.
State and federal judges adjudicating contract disputes should
consider whether management’s proposed course of action is a
reasonable, good-faith display of business judgment that promises
to maximize the value of the firm. Even in the absence of an
explicit duty that shifts to creditors, many commentators and
courts believe that managers continue to owe their fiduciary duty
in the first instance to the firm, not to shareholders directly. To
illustrate, consider lawsuits filed by creditors against a firm’s
board for violating covenants. While courts often consider these
to be contracts cases, it is easy to imagine how a fiduciary-duty
analysis could, consistent with Gheewalla and Quadrant, be
grafted on top. Courts can consider the board’s level of analysis
in connection with the disputed action and whether it was really
taken in good faith. Similarly, courts can view more skeptically
the technical arguments that a company complied with the letter
of a debt contract in a way that clearly violates the intended spirit
of the contractual covenant. In this way, management would be
restrained by having to justify conduct under more searching
judiciary scrutiny. While a more aggressive application of the
business-judgment rule would not eliminate bankruptcy hardball,
it would likely deter the most egregious cases.
Additionally, fraudulent-transfer litigation has been devalued
as an insolvency remedy. This kind of action currently takes a very
long time to litigate, and courts should be mindful of litigation
duration in scheduling hearings and ruling on fraudulent-transfer
motions. The slow-moving trains of justice embolden the entire
private-equity industry to extract excessive dividends from
portfolio firms, knowing that any fraudulent-transfer action might
take more than a decade to litigate, by which time most employees
currently at the private-equity firm will be gone. Bankruptcy
judges also should also consider whether fraudulent-transfer law
needs to operate more aggressively, mindful of Gheewalla and the
spate of opportunism since the financial crisis.
Finally, bankruptcy judges need to be more assertive in the
face of demands from management that certain liquidation is the
only alternative to a course of action that benefits one stakeholder
over another. There is no reason to think that debtor-in-possession
financing would really dry up if bankruptcy judges announced
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they would not allow such financings to limit the investigative
rights of unsecured creditors over purported fraudulent
transactions.
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